The 21st Century Mongol Conquest: Peace Mediator in the Korean Peninsula?

Introduction 

With each headline, North Korea’s image as an isolated state which is led by a rogue regime, is reinforced within the international community. Within the first two quarters of 2024 alone, the DPRK has supplied Russian forces with weaponry, tested several missiles, and sent a delegation to Iran. North Korea’s reputation is unlikely to change from the perspective of the Western Bloc as a rogue and irrational actor. The number of states maintaining optimistic relations with the West and North Korea is scarce. However, these states have the potential to facilitate peaceful negotiations between the West and North Korea. Mongolia presents itself as a perfect ally in rehabilitating North Korea within the international community. Just this year, 2024, there was a supposed meeting between North Korean and Japanese officials in Ulaanbaatar. Although it no longer seems to be the case, following the meeting Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida indicated that he was willing to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. However, the international community may consider Mongolia a potential location for further dialogue with North Korea in the future. By examining Mongolia’s geopolitical vulnerability, commitment to neutrality, and the state’s positive relationship with North Korea, this post will explore what makes Mongolia an ideal partner in restoring peaceful relations with North Korea and the international community.

Mongolia’s Geopolitical Vulnerability   

From Chinese ambiguity to Russian aggression to North Korean provocation, as well as the United States’ several security pacts in the region, it is clear that the region's future remains vague. Mongolia finds itself in an uncomfortable position as the state is sandwiched between two of the world’s great nuclear powers. Peace will undoubtedly always be an integral part of Mongolian foreign policy. Mongolia has actively pursued nuclear-free policies in both domestic and international politics since the 1990s. Today, Mongolia enjoys an internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status within the global community. The pursuit of such policies has installed Mongolia as an ideal partner to promote state-to-state conversations on nuclear issues. Mongolia’s commitment to peace can be seen as valid due to its geographical position isolating the state from Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and Eurasia, and when combined with a lack of economic incentives from foreign investors, Mongolia stands to gain many benefits from a peaceful North East Asia.

Mongolian Foreign Policy  

As mentioned above, Mongolia's geographical position could be better. Snuggly positioned between Russia and China, Mongolian foreign policy is cautious about making any moves that would be deemed hostile by either party. During the democratization process in the 1990s, Mongolia began to develop relationships that were not marked by “ideology-driven friendship.” US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Mongolia in the early 1990s marked what scholars call Mongolia’s “third-neighbor policy.” This involved Mongolia actively pursuing diplomatic relationships with regional players it had not historically had. Mongolia’s goal in adopting the “third-neighbor policy” was to weave a network of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral relationships to protect Mongolian security and interests while also keeping Russia and China at equal distances. This has led to Mongolia developing a stance of neutrality while maintaining its diplomatic relationships with China, Russia, and its other partners, as a means to neither aggravate Russia nor China, while not providing an opportunity to be used by its “third neighbor” allies to undermine the two.

Overview of DPRK-Mongolia Relations

North Korean-Mongolian relations were established shortly after the creation of the DPRK in 1948. Following the USSR, Mongolia was the second nation that recognized the DPRK as a sovereign nation. As the Mongolian People’s Republic was established in the mid-1920s, the MPR was eager to pursue relations with the newly founded DPRK as a fellow socialist state. This period is often labeled as “ideology-driven friendship” by scholars. As the Korean War manifested in 1950, the MPR was quick to send resources to the Northern regime. Also when compared to other fellow socialist states, Mongolia’s actions indicated that the MPR viewed the northern regime much more seriously by establishing a full-fledged embassy in Pyongyang, unlike North Korea’s Eastern European allies who established legations. However, the 1980s saw many of the DPRK’s bilateral relationships deteriorate. Kim Il Sung visited Mongolia in 1986 as North Korea’s relationship with the USSR and PRC was increasingly tarnished. The visit was used by Kim as an evaluation of Mongolian society to ultimately pursue stronger ties. However, some scholars pointed out that if North Korea deemed itself as having a stronger bargaining power, the DPRK often tried to impose dominance over its allies which indicated a level of arrogance that also strained the bilateral relationship. Despite this, ties between the two nations lasted for more than forty years, but when Mongolia began the democratization process in the 1990s, relations between the two states became increasingly worn. 

In its transition to democracy, Mongolia dropped the People’s Republic from its name. Mongolia's foreign policy of the mid-1990s involved building relations with well-established nations. Mongolian lawmakers began pursuing relations with states that were deemed as hostile adversaries under the socialist regime, particularly the United States and South Korea. The Mongolian pursuit of ties with the DPRK’s historical enemies caused tension between the former allies. When South Korean President Kim Daejung began pursuing his famed “Sunshine Policy.” Mongolia was quick to praise the South Korean leader. However, this furthered tensions between the two nations, and the DPRK recalled its diplomatic mission from Mongolia. However, despite the negative response from the North Korean side, Mongolia continued to pursue cordial relations with its former ally as a means to promote peace in the North East Asian Region. 

Economic Incentives

There have been several instances of Mongolian leaders expressing their interest in striking an agreement, which has never materialized, with the DPRK to lease access to North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Port. Mongolia has also been an avid supporter of the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI, formally known as the Tumen River Development Project). The goal of the project is to further economic and technological cooperation to promote prosperity in the North East Asian Region. The project would expand the Mongolian trade and tourism industries by gaining access to Europe and North East Asia by both land and sea. Original signatories of the initiative included China, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia, and South Korea, but the DPRK resigned its participation in the project in 2009. Combined with several other variables, the project has since stalled. Mongolia views the DPRK as an essential variable to Mongolian growth in the region. The Mongolian statement at the 18th Meeting of the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission showcases that North Korea's participation in the project is crucial to promoting peace and prosperity in the region:

“We reiterate the significance of engagement of all NEA (North East Asia) countries in GTI for enhanced regional economic integration and building up a shared future, and stress the need to promote dialogue and strengthen the collaboration with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Japan on project activities and other modalities of cooperation…”

Cultural Exchanges with North Korea 

Despite the DPRK’s history of viewing Mongolia as a friend or foe cycling from one another, it is unlikely that the relationship between the two will become fully severed. Throughout recent history, Mongolia has repeatedly sought friendly relations with the DPRK, and will likely continue to do so. As mentioned above, Mongolia's support for South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” strained relations, however, Mongolia continued to maintain its embassy in the North Korean capital while occasionally sending food aid. Despite many of North Korea’s actions coming into conflict with Mongolia’s ideals, the two states continue to see eye to eye in the other sectors. In the 2000s, the two agreed to aid each other in areas related to economy, culture, and education. The two regularly hold cultural exchanges, such as art exhibitions. Although meetings between the two vanished since the COVID-19 outbreak, a North Korean delegation visited Ulaanbaatar in March 2024, signaling a potential return of such meetings. Mongolian officials have also repeatedly visited Pyongyang to strengthen ties in cultural sectors, and such meetings will likely continue to do so to indicate a commitment to friendly relations in the region. 

Connection to the West 

Since undergoing democratization in the 1990s, Mongolia’s connection to the United States and its allies continues to expand. Mongolia's commitment to freedom and peace is a significant factor that appeals to the West. With the adoption of its Foreign Policy Concept, Mongolia listed nations such as the US, Japan, and Germany as being crucial in fostering healthy relations. Mongolia’s nuclear-free status has been commended as a peace-promoting nation by many in the international community, and Mongolia has continued to foster this image by advocating nuclear non-proliferation. Another example of the Mongolian promise to peace is the establishment of Khaan Quest. Established in 2003, Khaan Quest is the only military exercise where nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States participate in exercises with UN peacekeeping values at the forefront. The United States repeatedly celebrates the actions of Mongolia, and in 2018, the United States revered a great deal of praise for Mongolia. US officials emphasized Mongolia’s transition to a healthy democracy and the two nations’ unwavering devotion to freedom, democracy, and human rights. 

Mongolia’s Meditation Potential 

Mongolia views itself as an integral part of the Northeast Asia region that holds significant potential in peace mediation. Mongolia is adamant that no forceful change in North Korean leadership or society is acceptable and instead, a peaceful solution should be pursued. On the other hand, North Korea’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and human rights violations go against Mongolia’s key values. This makes Mongolia an ideal partner in mediation between North Korea and the Western Bloc as it views each parties’ concerns of great importance. The landlocked state has also repeatedly advocated for the return of the peace talks, and Mongolian officials have offered to be a mediator between the involved parties. Because of Mongolian actions in maintaining peaceful relations with all nations by adopting a policy of neutrality, Mongolia has been considered several times as a location for peace talks to take place. Before Singapore was selected as the location for the 2018 North Korea-United States Summit, Ulaanbaatar was cited as a possible location for the summit. It should also be noted that some policymakers and scholars have named Mongolia as a possible model for the DPRK if the state were to undergo societal changes. Mongolia’s successful and peaceful shift from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based economy can be a valuable tool for the DPRK. 

Case Study 

Mongolia is often seen petitioning for peaceful and meaningful dialogue between states. As mentioned in the previous section, Mongolia has consistently campaigned for the return of peaceful talks to resolve the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In 2013, Mongolia established its Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Initiative on Northeast Asian Security. The goal of the annual conference is for world leaders to discuss and promote peaceful solutions to de-escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In addition to hosting international peace forums, Mongolia also has hosted secret talks between DPRK officials and their international counterparts. In 2014, Mongolia facilitated a meeting between the DPRK’s Deputy Foreign Minister and a US State Department official. Mongolia often hosts these private talks between North Korea and others in the international community. Hosting these private talks has built confidence in Mongolia as a peace mediator, and it is now a surprise that it was first considered as a hosting place for the Trump summit. However, Mongolia has made a significant contribution to Japan-DPRK relations in facilitating these meetings.              

In recent times, Mongolia has been a location of contact for significant discussions to take place between Japan and North Korea. The abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and early 1980s continues to be a barrier for relation normalization between the DPRK and Japan. Due to domestic pressure in Japan, each Japanese administration is likely to pursue the resolution of the abductees. However, since dialogue began between the states, there has been little to no progress in the case. In an attempt to have this issue resolved, Mongolia has offered Ulaanbaatar as a location for dialogue to take place. In 2007 and again in 2012, Mongolia hosted talks where Japanese officials met their North Korean counterparts in the Mongolian capital in an attempt to find a solution for the case. There has not been much progress in the case, but in 2014, Mongolia was also the site for the daughter of Yokota Megumi, the poster child for the abduction cases, to meet her grandparents. Ultimately, the talks did not produce any significant requests, it demonstrates that the North Korean regime views Mongolia as a friendly neutral location for such discussions to take place.  

Conclusion 

North Korea’s repeatedly provocative actions continue to stir uncertainty for all nations in the region, and it is clear that for East Asia, a peaceful resolution on the Korean peninsula is crucial for stability in the region. Despite many viewing the DPRK as hostile, Mongolia continues to petition for North Korean participation in issues concerning North East Asia. It is unclear whether the near future will see the international community and North Korea normalize relations, but Mongolia should be considered as a potential tool in the peace process. Mongolia’s adoption of a neutral foreign policy, as well as its adamant position of peace, as well as its friendly relationship with Pyongyang, makes the nation an ideal meeting ground between the West and the DPRK. There has been significant research done concerning the role of small-state power. Mongolia’s role as a small state may be one of peace meditation.

By NKR Intern Alex Vega

*** The views herein do not necessarily reflect those of NKR or YINKS.

Works Cited

Asia Regional Integration Center. “Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA) Initiative.” Asian Development Bank, 2005. https://aric.adb.org/initiative/tumen-river-economic-development-area.

Balmforth, Tom, and David Gauthier-Villars. “Exclusive: Ukraine Examines N.Korean Missile Debris amid Fears of Moscow-Pyongyang Axis.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, May 27, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-examines-nkorean-missile-debris-amid-fears-moscow-pyongyang-axis-2024-05-07/.

Batchimeg, Migeddorj. “Mongolia’s DPRK Policy: Engaging North Korea.” Asian Survey 46, no. 2 (April 2006): 275-297. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.2.275.

Battsetseg Ochirkhuyag. “Is Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbor Policy’ Truly Effective?” The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs 24 (January 22, 2024). https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v24i1.3257.

Campi, Alicia. “Mongolia in Northeast Asia - the New Realities.” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, no. 12 (September 2, 2013): 46–64. https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v0i12.94.

Campi, Alicia. “How North Korea-Mongolia Relations Have Jump-Started the Korean Peninsula Peace Process.” East-West Center, February 20, 2019. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/how-north-korea-mongolia-relations-have-jump-started-the-korean-peninsula-peace-process.

Campi, Alicia. “Mongolia Nurtures Relations with North Korea as It Hopes for Official Future Role in Six-Party Talks.” The Jamestown Foundation, December 11, 2012. https://jamestown.org/program/mongolia-nurtures-relations-with-north-korea-as-it-hopes-for-official-future-role-in-six-party-talks/.

CBS News. “Mongolia, Singapore Are Final 2 Sites under Consideration for Trump-Kim Jong Un Meeting - CBS News.” CBS Interactive Inc., April 28, 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-location-mongolia-singapore/.

Chae, Yun-hwan. “N. Korean Delegation Departs for Mongolia.” Yonhap News Agency, March 10, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240310000400315.

Choi, Soo-Hyang, and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korea Sends Rare Delegation to Iran: What to Know.” TIME, April 24, 2024. https://time.com/6970285/north-korea-delegation-visits-iran-military-cooperation/.

Chuluunbaatar, Sumiya . “Why Did North Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister Visit Ulaanbaatar?” The Diplomat. Diplomat Media Inc., March 16, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/why-did-north-koreas-deputy-foreign-minister-visit-ulaanbaatar/.

Dierkes, Julian , and Otgonbaatar Byambaa. “Japan’s Mongolian Connection in North Korea.” East Asia Forum, November 6, 2013. https://eastasiaforum.org/2013/11/05/japans-mongolian-connection-in-north-korea/.

Dierkes, Julian, and Jargalsaikhan Mendee. “Mongolia in an Emerging Northeast Asian Region.” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs 20 (September 27, 2018): 91–100. https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v20i0.1026.

Dorjsuren, Nanjin. “Mongolia-DPRK Economic Relations.” ERINA Report, no. 109 (January 2013): 58–60. https://www.unii.ac.jp/erina-unp/archive/publications/er/er-2013/.

Enkhsaikhan, J. “Developing Nuclear Landscape in the Asian Heartland: Role of Nuclear-Weapon States.” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, no. 11 (September 15, 2013): 22–45. https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v0i11.105.

Eun-jung, Kim. “N. Korea Fires Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile into East Sea: JCS.” Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240402001500315.

Halbertsma, Tjalling H. F. “Mongolia and the DPRK at Sixty-Five: Ulaanbaatar’s Changing Relations with Pyongyang.” North Korean Review 10, no. 2 (September 1, 2014): 23-37. https://doi.org/10.3172/nkr.10.2.23.

Hong, Shinae. “The Diplomatic Power of Small States: Mongolia’s Mediation on the Korean Peninsula.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 4, no. 76 (March 26, 2022): 415–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2056577.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia. “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Initiative.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, n.d. https://mfa.gov.mn/en/documentation/61403/.

Munkhbat, Sainbuyan, and Mendee Jargalsaikhan. “Mongolia’s Balancing Act between the Two Koreas.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mongolia & Mongolian Institute for Innovative Policies, 2020. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mongolei/17714.pdf.

Oh, Sehyek. “From the Steppe to Pyongyang: Lessons from Mongolia’s Transition.” International Republican Institute, July 13, 2018. https://www.iri.org/news/from-the-steppe-to-pyongyang-lessons-from-mongolias-transition/.

Ryall, Julian. “North Korea and Iran — a New Anti-Western Alliance? – DW – 05/07/2024.” dw.com, May 7, 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-and-iran-a-new-anti-western-alliance/a-69014803.

Sanallkhundev, Bayasgalan. “Third Neighbor Policy Concept in Mongolia’s Geopolitics.” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs 22 (December 30, 2021): 81–98. https://doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v22i1.1774.

Szalontai, Balázs. “Small-Power Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: Mongolian–North Korean Relations during the Cold War, 1948–1989.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 45–63. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526825.

“Ulaanbaatar Declaration .” In The 18th Meeting of the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission. Greater Tumen Initiative, 2018. http://www.tumenprogramme.org/content/show.asp?m=114&d=120.

United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.” United Nations, n.d. https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-free-status.

 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on the Expanded Comprehensive Partnership Between the United States and Mongolia, (Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesperson, 2018) https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-expanded-comprehensive-partnership-between-the-united-states-and-mongolia/

Yi, Wonju. “(2nd LD) N.K. Leader’s Sister Says Japan’s PM Proposed Summit with Kim.” Yonhap News Agency, March 25, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240325005552315.