Factors to Successful Defection

Image credit. Global News https://globalnews.ca/news/3859804/how-many-north-korean-defectors/

In 2023, only 196 defectors in total entered South Korea, only 18% of the total defectors who entered the South Korean borders in 2019.1 The decrease in the defection rates brings the pivotal question: Why the sudden decrease in individuals escaping the borders of North Korea and what are the factors contributing to successful defections? This blog post seeks to explore this question, with the defector community serving as a lens into the North Korean State. By examining the fluctuation of trends, we aim to discuss the core factors influencing both the success and feasibility of defection. Central to this exploration lie three fundamental elements: the geographical location of being near the borders and mobility of the defector community, the diplomatic landscape shaping border policies, and political and economic forces serving as push factors for defecting.

Mobility and The Borders

Location and the freedom of movement within society to reach the Sino-Korean border is vital to a successful defection. The ability to easily travel within the borders of one's own country is a freedom declared within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 13. However, in North Korea this freedom is non-existent. Within the North Korean Constitution Article 75 of the September 1998 revision stated that citizens have the freedom of travel. However, there is debate on how truly ‘free’ this travel is. For those who want to travel outside their residential living area they must report to the People's Committee and acquire a travel permit.2 These travel permit applications have been known to be lengthy with mounds of paperwork and an interview and an extensive processing time close to 1-3 months. These travel permits are known to limit the access to medical care and quality education for the citizens of North Korea.3 Although they may try to travel without a permit, you face the consequences listed in Article 194 of the Violation of Public Order for Travels which states those who commit un-authorized travel or enter areas in which they are prohibited from will face warning, fines or even unpaid labor for three months.4 Having harsh limitations on movement with its borders means those who lie farther away from the Sino-Korean border may not even think about escaping because of the additional efforts in comparison to the border regions. If they desire to do so they must save money in order to bribe guards at the checkpoint, the officials who provide the travel permits and so many others just to even reach the border of China. Due to the limitations on freedom, about 70% of all North Korean defectors came from Yanggang or Hamgyong Province which are the regions of North Korea touching the Sino-Korean border.5 

Defection and mobility are irreparably gendered actions in the North Korean defector context, for every 3 defector men 7 women are defecting.6 Women have much more freedom in terms of mobility and opportunity in comparison to men, they are able to defect to China working as domestic workers which allows them to stay hidden for much longer. Their counterparts who are usually working in factories are regularly subject to raids, which leaves them settling for the option of frequently entering and exiting China's borders. The mobility of women is largely due to the increase of the Jangmadang markets. These markets came about in the 1990s after the “arduous march,” the North Koreans who were suffering the hardest economically needed to find a way to survive. These markets were run by women as their husbands had to work in the factory sector. In Maximilian Ernst and Roman Jurowetzki's analysis of women working in the markets and the correlation to defection, there was a link between the markets near the Chinese borders and the number of female defectors arriving in South Korea.7 The women having access to the borders as well as income to bribe guards allows them to have a greater chance of defecting.

Living on the borders has established a flow of information that North Koreans more inland may not have, which can break the veil the North Korean government is adamant about not revealing. The documentary The Jangmadang Generation, we can see through Danbi Kim's experience that she lived in a border region and had access to foreign films.8 Through this, she was able to question everything she had been taught and began to realize there were more economic opportunities outside of the borders.9 From Books to Films to more in-depth media, having access to this type of content can be highly influential for defection as it breaks the facade and everything they have been led to believe since birth.

Border Politics 

Border availability is another influential element to achieving successful defection. The first border these defectors must face is the Sino-Korean border; later, they may face travel to a 3rd or a 4th country. This border is a difficult one to cross due to the security on the border being tightened or loosened within different periods. The main issue with entering the Sino-Korean border is that China can not recognize North Koreans as asylum seekers or refugees, they recognize them instead as economic migrants due to the signing of the 1986 China-North Korea Bilateral Repatriation Agreement.10 They are subject to deportation and detention if they are captured and returned back to North Korea. Although China's border regions benefit greatly from the influx of North Korean defectors for economic labor, one of the reasons why China tightly controls its borders is the fear of unrest from the Chaoxianzu peoples, an ethnically Korean population recognized by the Chinese government. There is concern that this region could potentially demand autonomy, as there has always been apprehension about their loyalty. Another contributing factor for the fluctuation of the border control is analyzed by Kim Sae Young, where there is a correlation between North Korea’s provocations such as  withdrawing from the treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, and heightened missile and nuclear tests near Pyongyang and China subsequently ‘cracking down’ on the border regions security.11

If we look to other countries North Korean defectors have tried to escape to we can understand how diplomacy plays a large role in whether North Korean defectors get the aid they need to escape. For those defectors who have made it to Vietnam, due to the close relationship Vietnam has with South Korea, they have previously aided in airlifting 468 refugees to South Korea, despite tightening border controls and deporting people from several safe houses they are still relatively a safe country to flee into.12 Thailand currently is the preferred third-country destination due to the law that all North Koreans who are caught will be forced to serve one month in immigration jail and then released to the custody of South Korean agents.13 Laos had a large policy change in May of 2013 as they handed over 9 North Koreans to North Korea. This was the first time they had ever sent back North Korean defectors due to them having  cooperated with the South Korean government for a long period of time. But, it was rumored that there were some financial incentives for this exchange as well as the influence of large investments for infrastructure from China.14 After this exchange, the countries met and signed agreements to block these escape routes in the future.15 Another country of note is Mongolia, which claims to be a neutral state and has used this neutrality as an asset to pronounce itself as a mediator country for North Korea and other countries such as Japan.16 However, there has been evidence of migrations of North Korean workers in the region and the appearance of safe houses in which North Korean defectors can possibly hide themselves until they have the means to move elsewhere.17 

The Final Push

  The final foundational factor influencing the motivations behind North Korean citizens choosing to defect is the ‘final push’. These motivations are significant as they are what is propelling the defectors to make a life altering decision that could result in them being in harm's way. Every defector has a mixture of economic, political, social and personal reasons pushing them towards defection; however, for the categorization in this blog, there will be three main ‘pushes’ to defection: economic, political, and social which are all intertwined.

There is the political motivation for defection. Defectors may flee from North Korea due to the effects of political ostracization and insecurity. In the 1960s more than 70% of defectors escaped due to political motivations, “discontentment with Communism" or the “longing for South Korea”.18 Additionally, there is the threat for those who do not have a higher ranking in the songbun caste system. Through this system, individuals can earn respect but also face downgrades for a multitude of reasons, such as lack of political enthusiasm or having a family member convicted of a crime.19 This system feeds on fear and obedience, those who rank lower on the system or fear the repercussions of downgrading may choose to defect. There is also evidence of defection increasing after successions due to the fear of uncertainty. After Kim Jung-Un was announced as the successor of North Korea there was the largest increase in defectors since the Arduous March.20 Political insecurity due to changing leaders, the threat of political prisons or executions all weigh heavily on the choice to defect.

  The largest defector migration recorded was due to the economic crisis called the Arduous March or the North Korean Famine from 1994 to 1998. The U.S. State Department estimated the number of North Korean migrants at this time to be 30,000 to 50,000 while other scholars have estimated numbers up to 300,000.21 This migration was one of survival as death estimates in the country are starting from 240,000.22 This economic crisis was linked to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, a country in which they had many ties and some called their “Big Brother”'. A more recent economic uncertainty North Korea faced was when Kim Jung Un effectively shut all of North Korea’s borders in 2020 due to the COVID19 pandemic.23 This enforcement, although can be seen as a well-intended protection act to keep the population safe, causes a major effect on North Korea's economy. This complete border closure made an already economic and food insecure country suffer even more. North Korea's economy contracted by 4.5% in 2020 and with UN reports in 2019 estimating 43% of the population were food insecure, coupled with low crop yield due to severe flooding, 2020 had only exacerbated the country's ongoing crisis.24 

These instances of a lack of security are a large motivator in pushing for defection. They are defecting in order to seek better opportunities and survival. This can be seen in the North Korean women who choose to marry Chinese men in an effort to escape economic and food insecurity in North Korea. “I live like this to survive. I probably will be taken away someday, but I did it to eat as much as I could even if it was just temporary” a North Korean defector stated after she had been married to a Chinese man.25 Marriage for women is not the only economic opportunity available to the North Korean Defectors. In more recent years in Sino-Korean border regions there has been a trend of urbanization along the Chinese border. Many young Chinese workers are leaving to the cities in order to gain larger economic opportunities leaving the agricultural and domestic working sector empty. North Korean defectors that are extremely economically insecure are willing to work for “next to nothing, to live in very poor conditions and have no legal and few social rights and protection”.26 They are also able to assimilate into society almost unnoticed due to the Chaoxianzu community speaking Korean as well. This incentive to be economically free and provide for their families can be the biggest motivator for the North Korean defectors to escape. 

Implications and Future Prospects 

 Choosing to defect or migrate is not a decision that defectors make lightly; it carries significant weight. Many who choose this path put not only their own lives at risk but also the lives of their loved ones. Defectors provide indispensable insights into the inner workings of the regime and play a crucial role in raising global awareness about the plight of North Korean citizens. Additionally, they significantly contribute to their families’ economic stability by sending money for essential needs such as food, medical supplies, and education. As North Korea becomes increasingly isolated and external aid diminishes, NGOs are intensifying their efforts in border regions and third-country destinations. By understanding the specific needs and challenges faced by the defector community, these organizations can tailor their assistance programs more effectively. However, despite the severe restrictions imposed by Kim Jong Un and heightened border security, the number of successful defections remains uncertain, further complicated by ongoing struggles with poverty, food scarcity, and the impact of international sanctions.

This blog highlights key factors influencing successful defections, emphasizing the importance of targeted research. While each defector’s journey is unique and deeply personal, analyzing the stories of many reveals common struggles and motivations. By examining these shared narratives, we can better understand their challenges and identify critical areas for support during their escape. As we deepen our understanding, we may predict trends in defections and better comprehend individual motivations, informing the development of effective programs tailored to their needs upon arrival in their chosen country. Ultimately, these insights can help create a more supportive environment for those seeking a better life.

By NKR Intern Samantha Garcia

*** The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of NKR or the Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies.

Endnotes

1.  Ministry of Unification. n.d. "Statistics on North Korean Defectors." Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.

2.  ibid

3.  Lee, H., C. Robinson, J. Kim, M. McKee, and J. Cha. 2020. "Health and Healthcare in North Korea: A Retrospective Study among Defectors." Conflict and Health 14:41. doi:10.1186/s13031-020-00284-

4.  Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 2014. Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang, Korea: Juche 103.

5.  Korean Ministry of Unification. 2017. 2017 Unification White Paper. Seoul: Ministry of Unification.

6.  Sung, Kieun, and Sun Woong Cho. 2018. "Why Are North Korean Women More Likely to Defect than North Korean Men?" Asian Women 34(3):97-118. https://doi.org/10.14431/aw.2018.09.34.3.97.

7.  Ernst, Maximilian, and Roman Jurowetzki. 2016. "Satellite Data, Women Defectors, and Black Markets in North Korea: A Quantitative Study of the North Korean Informal Sector Using Night-Time Lights Satellite Imagery." North Korean Review 12:64-83.

8.  Liberty in North Korea (LiNK). 2018. "The Millennials of North Korea: The Jangmadang Generation." December 19. Retrieved December 28, 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvsqpwI_IfU).

9.  ibid

10.  Cohen, Roberta. 2014. "China’s Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure." International Journal of Korean Studies, Summer/Fall edition 

11.  Kim, S.Y. 2018. "China's Crackdown on North Korean Refugees: North Korean Provocations Intensify Border Control." Georgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.

12.  Bremer, Ifang, and Lina Park. 2023. "North Korean defector arrested in Vietnam faces repatriation to China: activists." NK News, December 15. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2023/12/north-korean-defector-arrested-in-vietnam-faces-repatriation-to-china-activists/.

13.  Jeong, Deborah Da Sol. 2020. "North Korean Refugees Along the Route to Freedom: Challenges of Geopolitics." Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, 3289. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/3289

14.  Song, Jiwon. 2016. "North Korean Refugees Along the Route to Freedom: Challenges of Geopolitics." Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, 3289. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/3289

15.  ibid

16.  https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mongolei/17714.pdf https://www.nknews.org/2019/06/how-mongolia-leverages-its-neutrality-to-influence-diplomacy-with-north-korea/

17.  Yeon, Seongjin. 2018. North Korean Defectors' Human Trafficking Victimization en Route to South Korea. Korean language. ISBN 979-11-89908-07-2. December 01.

18.  Lee, W.Y. 1997. "Northern Defectors in South Korea." Korea Focus 5:31–40. 

19.  Collins, Robert M. 2012. Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea's Social Classification System. Illustrated edition. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. ISBN 0985648007, 978098564800

20.  King, Robert R. January 27, 2021. Commentary on "Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.

21.  Peter Beck, Gail Kim and Donald Macintyre “Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China,” in Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares (eds.), Korea Yearbook (Boston: Brill, 2007), 253-282; United States Department of State, The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and the USG Policy Towards Them, (2005).

22.  ibid

23.  King, Robert R. January 27, 2021. Commentary on "Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two Decades" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades.

24.  Yeo, Andrew. 2021. "North Korea is addressing the pandemic in its style that means leaving a lot of people hungry." Brookings. November 22. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/north-korea-is-addressing-the-pandemic-in-its-style-that-means-leaving-a-lot-of-people-hungry/

25.  Muico, Norma Kang. 2005. "An Absence of Choice: The Sexual Exploitation of North Korean Women in China." Anti-Slavery International.

26.  Smith, Hazel. 2002. "North Koreans in China: Defining the Problems and Offering Some Solutions." University of Warwick. Accessed June 16, 2024. http://seoultrain.com/content/resources/nks_in_china-200207smith.pdf.